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Abstract 
 
In this study a macroeconomic credit risk model for stress testing the South African 
banking sector was developed. The findings demonstrate that macroeconomic 
shocks have a large impact on credit losses. However, owing to a high level of 
current capitalisation, the South African banking sector is resilient to severe 
economic shocks. At the same time, banks are rather sensitive to changes in real 
interest rates and property prices due to the high share of mortgages at flexible 
interest rates in their credit portfolios. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The current financial turmoil that originated with the sub-prime crisis in the United 
States of America (US) in 20072008 has emphasised the importance of credit risk 
for banking institutions. It also underlined the need for improved methodologies to 
better quantify banks’ vulnerabilities to different types of shocks with the use of stress 
tests. Well-functioning financial markets contribute to economic growth via more 
efficient allocation of resources and risk diversification (Levine, 1997; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Aryeetey, 2003; Khan and Senhadji, 2003; Reinhart and Tokatlidis; 
2003). However, financial liberalisation can also render the banking sector more 
fragile, which calls for adequate banking regulation and supervision.  
 
The Basel II framework requires banks to conduct stress tests on their potential 
future minimum capital requirements and consider at least the effect of mild 
recession scenarios. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have 
been using stress testing as a part of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
(FSAP) since 1999. In 2008, for the first time they undertook stress testing of the 
South African financial sector, relying on publicly available data (IMF, 2008). The 
present paper contributes to their work by focusing on credit risk stress testing and 
using data provided by banks to the South African Reserve Bank. It can serve as a 
framework for future stress testing exercises by individual banks and regulatory 
authorities in South Africa and other developing countries.  
 
There are two main approaches to stress testing. On the one hand, “bottom up” 
approach requires individual large banks to perform stress testing of their portfolios 
and then these individual results are aggregated. On the other hand, “top down” 
stress-testing - the subject of this paper - is performed by a central bank on the 
sample of all or the largest financial institutions and can be used for two purposes. 
First, it can be used to verify the robustness of individual banks methodologies. 
Second, it should be viewed as a tool of macro-prudential regulation and supervisors, 
when banking regulators and supervisors do not just focus on the health of individual 
institutions but consider risks to the stability of the whole financial system. This 
approach has been emphasized by all proposals for reform of the financial regulation 
published in the wake of the crisis (Turner Report (2009), The Geneva Report on the 
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World Economy (2009), de Larosiere Report (2009), US Treasury White Paper 
(2009)). 
 
Relying on the recent literature on stress testing of credit risk, this paper proposes 
models that were constructed for different economic sectors of the economy, such as 
households, mining, transport, electricity and other. As the dependent variable, the 
loan loss provisions on a bank level were used for each economic sector. 
Macroeconomic scenarios were then developed that describe severe, but plausible, 
economic shocks. Finally, based on the estimated coefficients, the impact of these 
scenarios on additional loan loss provisions and capital-adequacy ratios was 
predicted.  
 
The findings demonstrate that macroeconomic shocks have a large impact on the 
credit losses of South African banks, which is in line with recent finding showing that 
stress events have a larger impact in less-developed countries (Jakubik and 
Schmieder, 2008). However, owing to the high level of current capitalisation, the 
South African banking sector is resilient to rather severe economic shocks, which can 
be absorbed by banks’ capital. At the same time, banks are sensitive to changes in 
real interest rates and property prices. Property prices have a disproportional impact, 
because mortgages constitute the largest share of banks’ portfolios. A decrease in 
property prices might leave borrowers with negative equity, increasing defaults on 
existing mortgages. In addition, since most borrowers have loans with flexible interest 
rates, they have greater difficulty repaying loans when interest rates go up. Other 
factors, such as GDP growth, exchange rate and commodity prices, have a much 
smaller impact on the credit risk of banks.  
 
Due to such sizable impact of property prices on credit risk in our model, the results 
of the stress-testing exercise depend to a great extend on the chosen scenario of 
property prices development. Hence, we offer a rigorous analysis of this variable 
which shows that recent increases in property prices are likely to have reflected 
fundamentals and therefore should not decline significantly. This investigation helps 
us to construct plausible macro-economic scenario for property prices development 
in South Africa.  
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A key limitation of the study is the short span of available data, which is a common 
problem for developing and transition economies. The data employed in this study 
cover the period of eight years from 2001 to 2008. A robustness check is performed 
with the data that cover the period between 1994 and 2007, but was discontinued 
due to the transition to Basel II reporting standards in 2008. The starting point for 
stress testing was June 2008. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
methodology and data. Section 3 presents univariate and multivariate regressions. 
Section 4 presents macroeconomic stress scenarios, and reports on their impact on 
credit impairments and capital-adequacy ratios. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Empirical methodology and the choice of data 
 
The most popular approach to stress-testing in countries with less developed banking 
systems is a simple mechanical exercise, in which banks’ balance sheets items 
(nonperforming loans or provisions) are shocked directly and a link to the macro  
economy is not modeled explicitly. Such tests assess the capitalization of the sector 
if banks were forced to raise their loan loss provisioning to reflect loan quality 
deterioration either overall or in particular parts of their portfolio.  
In this paper, we can rely on a methodology used in countries with more advanced 
banking sectors, which is based on modeling NPLs or loan-loss provisions as a 
function of various macroeconomic variables. This approach has been used as part 
of FSAP of IMF in Austria, Czech Republic, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Romania, 
Russia and Sweden (Stolz and Swinburne, 2008).2 This approach has been also 
used by central banks in developed countries and increasingly in developing ones. 
Following these approaches, we plan to estimate the following model: 
 
Credit riskit =α1 + α2GDPt + α3Pricest + α4Interestt + α5Householdt + α6Externalt + εit  
2 Since January 2008, South African banks have adopted Basel II and report probability of default, 
which would be the best proxy and has been used in stress testing models in many developed 
countries. However, this measure could not be used in the present study, because it aimed to estimate 
a macroeconomic credit risk model and this requires relatively long time series. 
where  Credit Riskit  is a variable that measures the quality of the loan portfolio, GDPt 
- business environment, Interestt - cost of borrowing, Pricest - stability of prices, 
Householdt - household sector indicators, and Externalt - external sector indicators 
that can influence credit risk of banks. Next two sub-sections describe these 
variables in more detail. 
2.1 Credit risk proxies 
There are a number of credit risk indicators that can be used as proxy for credit risk.  
For this paper, the preferred measure is loan loss provisions raised against loans 
extended to different economic sectors. This is one of the most commonly used 
measures in stress testing (Moretti et al., 2008). 
Loan loss provisions are raised by banks against non-performing loans and are 
available on a quarterly basis. South African banks are required to report credit 
exposure and loan loss provisions with respect to loans extended to different sectors 
of the economy: households; agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; 
electricity, gas and water; trade and accommodation; transport and communication; 
finance and insurance; real estate and business services; community, social and 
personal services; and other. In practice, the data on a number of sectors such as 
agriculture, manufacturing, construction, finance, real estate and community services 
are very limited. Still, data are available on a number of important sectors, in 
particular loans to households, which amount to more than 40 per cent of the total 
loans (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Sectoral composition of credit to the private sector in 2008 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Individuals Finance
Transport Agriculture
Community Manufacturing
Mining Construction
Electricity Finance
Individuals Other
Real estate Trade
 
The estimation made in the present study relied on the data for the largest five 
banks, also known as the ‘big five’, (i.e., Absa Bank LTD, FirstRand Bank LTD, 
Investec LTD, Nedbank LTD and The Standard Bank of South Africa LTD). These 
institutions constitute 92 per cent of the total banking assets (June 2008), which 
makes them systemically important banks (Figure 2). Moreover, these banks have 
very similar credit portfolios, which react in a similar manner to various 
macroeconomic shocks. Other banks can be described as niche banks: they focus 
on very different lines of business (e.g., trading or overdraft), which makes it difficult 
to model an econometric relationship between their credit risk and macroeconomic 
environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Market shares of different groups of banks in South Africa in 2008 
 
Big Five
Big trading branches
Main business: overdraft and loans
Main business: mortgages and asset finance
Main business: trade finance
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
The only disadvantage to using loan loss provisions as a measure of credit risk in this 
study is the fact that it starts in 2001. Since that period, South Africa has enjoyed 
steady economic growth, which only started to slow down now in the wake of the 
financial turmoil in 2007. Therefore, a relationship between credit risk and the macro-
economic environment during economic downturns cannot be estimated.  
 
To overcome the problem of short time series of data, a robustness check was done 
with overdue loans as a dependent variable. Prior to the introduction of Basel II in 
2008, banks were required to report overdue loans with respect to different credit 
products. The data on overdue mortgages, leases and instalment debtors, and other 
loans go back to 1994. This made it possible to estimate a model over the whole 
business cycle for such an important credit product as mortgages, which amounted 
to over 40 per cent of total loans in 2007 (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
Figure 3 Product-based composition of loans and advances in 2008 
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MortgagesOther 
Leases and installments 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
Since most of mortgages are extended to individuals, this measure of credit risk is 
closely correlated with loan loss provisions for individual loans. However, a ratio of 
loan loss provisions to overdue loans has not been constant. In fact, it rose after 
2001 and peaked in 2005, declining thereafter (Figure 4). One of the possible 
explanations for this is banks’ increased risk averseness after the banking turmoil 
that shook the South African banking sector in 2001 (IMF, 2008). 
 
Despite availability of data for the period 1994−2000, overdue loans might not 
provide a very reliable measure of credit risk. The definition of ‘overdue loans’ 
changed a few times throughout this period. Before September 1996, banks reported 
overdue loans with cut-offs at one, three and six months. Between 1996 and 
September 1998, banks used four- and six-month cut-offs. The Asian crisis motivated 
the South African Reserve Bank to tighten its definition of overdue loans, and loans 
that were overdue by one and three months had to be reported. In order to 
harmonise the data in this study, three months was used as the cut-off for the 
definition of ‘overdue loans’ whenever possible, but the changes in reporting and 
data availability necessitated a four-month cut-off for the period between September 
1996 and September 1998.3 
Figure 4 The ratio of total loan loss provisions to overdue loans 
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2.2 Macroeconomic variables  
 
As measures of macroeconomic environment, a number of indicators that should 
have a significant impact on the South African banking sector were selected. These 
indicators are classified in the following groups: business, interest rate, price stability, 
household and external. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
The choice of macroeconomic variables used in the study was motivated by Boss 
(2002), Gray and Walsh (2008), and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002). The data were 
provided either by the South African Reserve Bank or Statistics South Africa 
(Stats SA). Summary statistics of these variables are given in Table 2.  
3 One of the alternative variables as a measure of credit risk could be liquidations of firms, and 
insolvencies of individuals and partnerships. The advantage of these indicators is long time series that 
go back over the entire business cycle. The disadvantage is the lack of data on total number of 
companies, individuals and partnerships, so that the default ratio cannot be calculated. Therefore, one 
can only look at growth of liquidations and insolvencies, which appear to be negatively correlated with 
a business cycle. Another disadvantage of this proxy is the fact that it includes all firms in the 
economy, many of which might not have access to the banking sector. Changes in liquidations might 
be driven by problems among small and medium enterprises, which could have a very limited impact 
on the banking sector.  
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Table 1 Definition of macroeconomic variables 
Variable Definition 
  
Business activity 
GDP growth Real GDP growth  
GFCF Real growth in gross fixed capital formation  
Index Change in All-share index at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
Interest rate 
Prime rate 
 
Nominal prime overdraft interest rate set by the South African 
Reserve Bank  
Real prime 
 
Real prime overdraft interest rate set by the South African Reserve 
Bank  
BA rate Real interest rate at which banker's acceptances are traded 
Prices 
Inflation Inflation without housing costs  
M1 growth Growth in M1 aggregate  
M2 growth Growth in M2 aggregate  
M3 growth Growth in M3 aggregate  
Household sector 
Property  Nominal growth in property prices  
Consumption  Growth in real consumption  
Debt/Income A ratio of debt to disposable income of households  
Employment  Change in the employment index  
Wage Change in wage index  
External economy 
Commodities Change in commodity price index 
Oil price Change in oil prices 
REER Change in real effective interest rate 
Terms of trade Change in terms of trade 
Note: All variables are expressed in per cent and represent annual changes.  
Source: Constructed by author 
 
The first group of indicators relates to business activity and the underlying 
assumption is that loan quality is sensitive to an economic cycle. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth, gross fixed capital formation and the stock market index are 
included and are assumed to be negatively correlated with credit risk. As growth 
slows down, falling incomes, unemployment and business failures increase credit 
risk.  
 
Interest rates represent the direct cost of borrowing and thus should have a positive 
impact on credit risk, as firms and household face higher repayment costs and are 
more likely to default on their payments. This impact should be especially strong in 
South Africa, where banks extend most of their loans at flexible interest rate, passing 
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interest rate risk to borrowers. Three rates are examined in this study: (1) nominal 
prime interest rate, (2) real prime interest rate, and (3) bankers’ acceptance rate. 
While prime rate moves in line with the repurchase (repo) rate, which is set by the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the South African Reserve Bank, the bankers’ 
acceptance rate is market-driven.  
Table 2 Summary statistics for macroeconomic variables (1994−2008) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
   1994−2008 2001−2008 
Business activity   
GDP growth 3,62 2,00 -0,90 7,60 1,10 7,20
GFCF 7,61 9,07 -2150 22,55 -5,32 22,55
Index 16,47 20,22 -31,77 68,33 -31,77 68,33
Interest rate   
Prime rate 15,59 3,57 10,50 25,50 10,50 17,00
BA rate 4,66 2,65 -0,11 11,32 -0,11 7,41
Real prime  8,74 2,98 2,97 16,18 2,97 11,13
Prices    
Inflation 6,66 2,15 2,99 12,35 2,99 12,35
M1 growth 17,26 9,23 -3,50 39,25 -3,50 25,45
M2 growth 15,60 4,43 5,56 24,26 9,14 24,26
M3 growth 16,11 4,79 6,17 28,06 10,81 28,06
Household sector   
Property  14,37  7,99 2,57 35,68 2,57 35,68
Consumption  4,55 2,32 -0,20 9,50 1,20 9,50
Debt/Income 59,89 7,80 49,82 78,16 49,82 78,16
Employment  0,53 1,84 -3,95  4,52 -3,95 4,52
Wage 1,68 2,64 -5,89 8,26 -5,89 6,52
External economy   
Commodities 10,54 18,72 -25,74 62,19 -25,74 62,19
Oil price 19,48 35,94 -41,94 160,89 -41,85 84,64
REER -0,74 11,34 -25,04 32,62 -25,04 32,62
Terms of trade 0,63 3,07 -7,16 6,79 -5,41 6,79
Sources: South African Reserve Bank and Statistics South Africa 
 
Consumer price inflation is also included as a measure of price stability. Higher 
inflation may assist borrowers in repaying their debt, since the real value of the debt 
repaid at some point in the future is less than the loan. At the same time, higher 
inflation could force central banks to set interest rates higher, which might increase 
the repayment burden, especially if wages do not compensate for the growth in 
inflation. Figure 5 shows inflation and real wage growth for the period 1995−2008, 
and indeed real wages grew the least during higher inflation and this negative 
relationship intensified after 2000. There are some periods when high inflation even 
made real wages decline, which would have made loan repayment problematic. 
Money growth, which is linked to inflation, is also included.  
Figure 5 The relationship between inflation and real wages 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
Another important explanatory variable is property prices. Higher property prices are 
associated with higher rate of loan repayment due to positive wealth effects. Even if 
borrowers are having trouble making payments, they will always prefer to sell their 
homes rather than default, as long as the equity in their homes is positive so they can 
pay off their outstanding mortgage balances with the proceeds of the sales. In 
contrast, lower property prices can lead to negative equity for homeowners, meaning 
that the outstanding balance on their mortgage exceeds their home’s current market 
value. Such a situation could reduce their ability and motivation to repay a loan. The 
situation can be exacerbated in a country where many borrowers are first-time 
homeowners.  
 
Since the largest share of loans is extended to individuals, household-sector 
indicators could be central to estimations. Therefore, consumption, employment and 
wage growth are examined, and are expected to have an inverse relationship with 
credit losses. Household indebtedness measured as a ratio of debt to disposable 
income is also studied.  
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The South African economy is closely integrated into the world economy due to trade 
and financial linkages. Therefore, the commodity price index, oil price index, real 
effective exchange rate and the terms of trade are included. It should be stated that 
these indicators have been very closely correlated since 2000. Theoretically, as an 
exporter of gold and platinum, South Africa should benefit from higher prices of 
metals and as an importer of oil; it should be negatively affected by growth in oil 
prices. In practice it is almost impossible to differentiate between these two impacts 
on economic growth because of the high correlation between all commodity prices 
after 2000. However, as oil prices grew at a faster rate than metal prices, South 
Africa experienced a deteriorating trade balance. Figure 6 shows the difference 
between gold exports and oil imports, and as the price for oil skyrocketed during 
2007−2008, the difference grew increasingly negatively. 
Figure 6 Difference between gold export and oil import (US dollar per barrel) 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
At the same time, the importance of mining in South Africa should not be overstated. 
Figure 7 shows that the share of mining in total GDP declined from almost 10 per 
cent in 1994 to 5,5 per cent in 2008, whereas a share of gold exports to total exports 
went down from almost 40 to less than 10 per cent. This explains why in the following 
section, the price of gold is included only in the model for the mining sector and is 
excluded from other sectoral models.  
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Figure 7 Importance of mining for the South African economy (in per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
 
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
 
Gold to total exports (lhs) Mining to GDP (rhs)
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
3 Estimation 
3.1 Preliminary univariate regressions 
 
This sub-section presents results of univariate estimations. These regressions are 
intended to show all variables that were considered to be drivers of credit risk, and 
which were studied as candidates for the multivariate model presented in the sub-
section 3.2. Table 3 reports findings for two different measures of credit risk: loan 
loss provisions and overdue loans. For overdue loans, results for the period between 
1994 and 2007 are reported, as well as for a shorter period between 2001 and 2007 
to make them more comparable with regressions for loan loss provision ratios.  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn: First, the signs of coefficients are mostly in 
line with the theory. When economic activity picks up, credit risk goes down, whereas 
higher interest rates and inflation increases have a positive impact on credit risk. 
Second, the explanatory power of coefficients often drops significantly when one 
considers the sample between 1994 and 2007 for overdue loans. This is driven by 
lack of any meaningful relationship between overdue loans and the macroeconomic 
environment for the period before 2001, which leaves one without a reliable 
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estimated model during a downturn phase of the economic cycle.4 This issue will be 
revisited in the analysis of multivariate estimations below.  
Table 3 Univariate regressions 
Loan loss 
provision Overdues Overdues 
2001−2008 2001−2008 1994−2008 Dependent 
variable Coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 
Business 
activity   
GDP growth -0,09*** 0,11 -0,50*** 0,18 -0,09* 0,01
GFCF -0,02*** 0,20 -0,05*** 0,05 -0,05*** 0,09
Index -0,01*** 0,08 -0,03*** 0,12 -0,02*** 0,06
Interest rate   
Prime rate 0,02 0,01 0,34*** 0,15 0,04** 0,01
BA rate 0,09*** 0,16 0,04 0,00 -0,03 0,00
Real prime  0,09*** 0,19 0,10*** 0,01 -0,01 0,00
Prices   
Inflation -0,02 0,02 0,27*** 0,08 0,18*** 0,06
M1 growth -0,03*** 0,27 -0,07*** 0,07 -0,06*** 0,13
M2 growth -0,05*** 0,21 -0,13*** 0,06 -0,12*** 0,11
M3 growth -0,06*** 0,37 -0,11*** 0,08 -0,09*** 0,10
Household 
sector   
Property  0,01*** 0,08 -0,04*** 0,04 -0,02** 0,01
Consumption -0,04*** 0,05 -0,37*** 0,22 -0,15*** 0,06
Debt/Income -0,02*** 0,07 -0,16*** 0,29 -0,10*** 0,16
Employment  -0,11*** 0,13 -0,34*** 0,13 -0,28*** 0,09
Wage 0,00 0,00 -0,05** 0,01 -0,07*** 0,01
External 
economy   
Commodities -0,01*** 0,05 -0,05*** 0,16 -0,03*** 0,05
Oil price -0,00** 0,03 -0,02*** 0,10 -0,01*** 0,02
REER 0,01*** 0,04 -0,01** 0,01 -0,01 0,00
Terms of trade 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,00
***, ** and * correspond to 1, 5 and 10 significance levels respectively. 
Source: Computed by author 
 
3.2 Multivariate regressions 
 
In this section, multivariate regressions with loan loss provisions as the dependent 
variable were estimated. This measure of credit risk was chosen because it allows for 
an analysis of banks’ credit risk within different economic sectors. Despite longer 
                                                
4 A robustness check with liquidations and insolvencies as dependant variable was also done, but in 
this case also it failed to establish meaningful and significant relationships for the period before 2001. 
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time series for other proxies for credit risk, such as overdue loans and firm 
liquidations, they were discarded because no observable statistically significant 
relationship existed for the period before 2001. One of the reasons for this is frequent 
change of definitions, as well as poorer reporting standards during the earlier period 
analysed.  
 
Because of the high correlation between various macroeconomic variables presented 
in univariate regressions, they could not all be included simultaneously. Therefore, at 
the outset at least one variable from each group of indicators is included. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year due to the fact that loan loss provisions 
are often criticized for being backward looking due to their event-driven nature 
required by the current international accounting standards. This also controls for 
potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables. All models in this study were 
estimated using random effects panel data methodology, relying on Hausman test 
results that indicate that random effects regressions are consistent and efficient. We 
have further allowed observations to be correlated within the same bank and 
adjusted robust standard errors accordingly for each cluster. Before turning to the 
regression analysis, the univariate time series properties of the data were analysed. 
Since changes in property prices turn out to be non-stationary, they were input in first 
differences. Finally, after testing various specifications and relying on Akaike and 
Schwartz criteria, industry-specific models that are the most useful in describing 
historic loan loss provisions were obtained. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
The model for total loans is driven by the model for loans to individuals (the largest 
share in banks’ portfolios) and so they both include GDP growth, inflation, property 
prices, and real effective exchange rate as explanatory variables, and they all have 
expected sign. During an economic upswing, it is easier for individuals to repay loans 
because of higher wages and lower unemployment. Higher interest rates increase 
the repayment burden for borrowers with flexible interest rate contracts, making them 
more likely to default. Since a large share of loans to individuals are mortgages, 
rising house prices increase borrower wealth, facilitating loan repayment.5  
5 An attempt was also made to input a dummy to control for the introduction of Basel II, but it turned 
out to be insignificant. The introduction of massive changes in reporting of credit risk did not have any 
significant impact on loan loss provisions, after controlling for changes in macroeconomic 
environment.  
 
 
17
Table 4 Multivariate regressions 
 Total Household Mining Transport Electricity Other 
GDP growth -0,08*** -0,08***    -0,77** 
Inflation 0,08*** 0,14***    0,76*** 
BA rate 0,14*** 0,18***    0,68* 
Property -0,08* -0,09*     
REER 0,01*** 0,01*** -0,029*  -0,06*  
Gold   -0,016 *   
GFCF (transport)    -0,03*   
Oil     0,33***  
Commodity      0,03** 
Basel II       
Constant 0,50 0,09 1,36*** 1,78*** 1,65 -4,50 
R2 0,16 0,20 0.04 0,03 0,10 0,13 
Observations 135 135 116 119 103 119 
Dependant variable: loan loss provisions ratio. The models are estimated using a random effects panel data 
methodology, with robust standard errors adjusted for intra-bank correlation. 
***, ** , * correspond to 1, 5, and 10 significance levels , respectively. 
Source: Computed by author 
 
Despite all variables in the model being statistically significant, the main driver of 
credit risk is changes in nominal property prices. Table 5 presents the economic 
significance of coefficients. A two-standard deviation decline in property prices 
(16 per cent) would increase loan loss provisions ratio by 1,47 percentage points. 
The second variable in order of economic significance is interest rate: a two standard 
deviation increase in real interest rate would add 0,96 percentage points to loan loss 
provisions ratio. Other variables have a considerably lower impact on loan loss 
provisions. For example, since most loans are extended in domestic currency, 
exchange rate fluctuations have only limited impact on credit losses. This has 
important implications for stress testing, since large shocks to property prices and 
interest rates would lead to larger increases of credit risk, then shocks to GDP growth 
or exchange rate. 
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Table 5 Economic significance of coefficients of model for total loans 
Variables 
Two-standard 
deviations
Impact on loan loss 
provisions
GDP growth 4,00 -0,31
Inflation 4,30 0,59
BA rate 5,26 0,96
Property 15,98 -1,47
REER 22,68 0,18
Source: Computed by author 
 
Next, separate models for mining, transportation, electricity and other sectors were 
constructed. In line with expectations, an increase in the price of gold (the main 
South African export item) is manifested in lower loan loss provisions for the mining 
sector. At the same time, higher oil prices make it more difficult for the electricity 
sector to remain profitable, which leads to higher defaults and therefore higher loan 
loss provisions for banks.  
Appendix A demonstrates the performance of the estimated models for the 
households, mining, transportations, and electricity sectors, as well as total loan loss 
provisions. The model for the household sector correctly captures a decline in loan 
loss provisions between 2004 and 2006, and an increase in 2008. The performance 
of models for other sectors is less precise, but nevertheless, they all capture time 
pattern of loan loss provisions in a meaningful way.  
3.3 Robustness test 
Before moving to stress testing of the South African banking sector, a robustness 
check was constructed and a model with an alternative measure of credit risk − 
overdue loans for mortgages − was estimated. After testing various specifications, a 
model was arrived at that includes GDP growth, real interest rate, inflation and 
growth in commodity prices. This model was estimated for the periods between 
2001−2007 and 1995−2007. The results are presented in Table 6. All variables have 
expected signs, but the significance of coefficients diminishes significantly in the 
model estimated for the whole period (1995−2007). In fact, when attempting to 
estimate the model only for the period before 2001, one cannot come up with any 
specification where at least one explanatory variable is significant and has a 
meaningful interpretation. This leaves one with no estimated model for the earlier 
period during which the South African economy experienced a significant downturn in 
the wake of the Asian crisis.  
Table 6 Multivariate regressions 
Overdues for 
mortgages
Overdues for 
mortgages
 2001−2007 1994−2007
GDP growth -0,4*** -0,05
Inflation 0,5*** 0,243***
BA rate 0,32*** -0,01
Commodity -0** -0,02*
Constant 0,91 2,122
R2 0,38 0,085
Observations 135 246
Dependent variable: overdue ratio. The models are estimated using random effects panel data 
methodology, with robust standard errors adjusted for intra-bank correlation. 
***, ** and * correspond to 1, 5, and 10 significance levels, respectively. 
Source: Computed by author 
 
Figure 8 Performance of the model for mortgages 
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Given that the data do not allow for an estimation of a model for the period before 
2001, the forecasting power of the model estimated for the period between 2001 and 
2007 when it is applied to the period before 2001 was tested. Theoretically, upswings 
and downturns do not have a symmetric impact on credit risk and therefore it is 
important to test how the present model (estimated for an upward phase) will perform 
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during a downward phase of the economic cycle. Results are presented in Figure 8. 
Similar to previous models, this estimated model correctly captures the decline in 
overdue loans between 2003 and 2006, and an increase afterwards. However, the 
model is less precise in predicting the ratio of overdue loans for the period before 
2001. One of the plausible reasons for this is the frequent change in definition of 
’overdue loans’, which was explained in section 2.1. The estimated overdue loans 
overestimate actual overdue loans, which must be kept in mind when predicting 
future credit risk under different macroeconomic scenarios.  
4 Macroeconomic stress scenarios 
4.1 Development of macroeconomic stress scenarios 
A crucial aspect of employing stress tests is the selection of scenarios. On the one 
hand, stress tests are aimed at exploring the impact of extreme events. On the other 
hand, if these events are highly unlikely, the results have little importance for policy 
makers. Most of the criticism of stress testing studies is directed at the choice of 
stress scenarios, which depict either a too-rosy or a too-bleak picture of financial 
system vulnerabilities. To overcome this problem, three approaches to defining 
scenarios were chosen: (1) worst historic scenario, (2) a change of two standard 
deviations from the current value and (3) a scenario based on expert opinions. All 
scenarios are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 Macroeconomic scenarios 
Worst historic 
scenario
Unfavourable 
change of two 
standard 
deviations from 
current value 
Expert 
opinion
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
GDP growth (in %) -0,9 (1998) 0,9 -2
Inflation (in %) 14,09 (2008) 16,64 15
Real interest rate (in %) 12,01 (1998) 5,14 5
Nominal property prices growth 2,57 (2008) -12,44 0
REER -25,03 (2001) -31,07 -35
Price of gold (in US$) 256,14 (1999) 573,01 600
Price of oil (in US$) 132,15 (2008) 181,74 100
Growth in GFCF (transportation) -44,04 (1999) -19,92 -44
Source: Computed by author 
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One possibility is to examine the impact of historically observed values of 
macroeconomic variables, which appear to be plausible, since these events had 
already taken place in the past. In the case of South Africa, the maximum or 
minimum value of each macroeconomic variable for the period between 1994 and 
2008 was chosen. The values of each variable and year in which it occurred are 
presented in Table 7. The current economic situation, however, presents additional 
challenges, since many of the worst historic values are reported in the year 2008. 
Unlikely events with low probability become reality. This raises the question of 
whether one should choose even more severe macroeconomic scenarios than those 
observed in the past. It should be mentioned, that the full impact of the current 
macroeconomic environment has not yet been fully passed on to banks in terms of 
higher loan loss provisions. In the present model the explanatory variables were 
lagged by one year, which means that the model forecasts the full impact of the 
current economic environment only for June 2009. 
 
An alternative way of designing a macroeconomic scenario is to change the value of 
the macroeconomic variable in an unfavourable direction by two standard deviations. 
This method has two main advantages over the historic worst scenario method. First, 
the change happens in a more plausible manner and not in an abrupt way. Consider, 
for example, the change in real interest rate, which currently amounts to - 0,11 per 
cent, but could jump to 12,01 if the worst historic scenario is applied. A more 
plausible event is the increase of real interest rates by two standard deviations (to 5 
per cent). Second, this method allows one to design a more severe stress test in 
cases where a variable has been growing in a favourable direction during the 
analysed period. For example, nominal house prices have never been negative in 
South Africa since 1994, but if two standard deviations are subtracted from their 
current value, one arrives at a decline of 12 per cent.  
 
Finally, macroeconomic scenarios can be based on expert opinions. In this case, 
scenarios are constructed in such a way that they reflect current expectations in the 
movement of the macroeconomic variables, but with additional stress. For half of 
variables, the scenario based on expert opinions appears to be even more severe 
than the worst historic scenario. This is the case with GDP growth which, historically, 
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has been as low as -0,9, but which is not considered by experts as stressful enough 
for the South African economy. Instead, a 2 per cent decline was considered. 
 
Very careful consideration should be given to property prices, which have the largest 
impact on future credit losses for two reasons. First, they have an impact on loans to 
households, which have the largest share in portfolios of South African banks. 
Second, the economic significance of property prices coefficient is much larger than 
that of any other variables, such as interest rate, inflation or GDP growth.  
 
In order to decide which property price change is plausible, a thorough examination 
of house prices is warranted. There are a number of approaches to addressing this 
question. First, one could look at the growth of property prices relative to growth in 
rent rates for equivalent property. Second, one could construct an econometric model 
that looks at the main drivers of property prices. Finally, one should consider the 
burden of mortgage debt on households, since even if housing prices reflect 
fundamentals; high debt-to-income ratios might signal the difficulty of households to 
repay their mortgages. A detailed analysis of these issues is presented in 
Appendix B. Taking into account all the arguments, the present study assumes a 
zero percent increase in nominal property prices as a stressful scenario, which leads 
to a 15 per cent decline in real property prices. While this scenario can be considered 
as too mild by some economists, our analysis shows that growth in property prices in 
the past has reflected economic fundamentals, and therefore one should not observe 
any drop in nominal property prices.  
Because of the boom−bust behaviour of oil prices, which dropped from a high of 
US$140 in June 2008 to US$55 in November 2008, the historic scenario appears to 
be irrelevant. Therefore, an increase in the oil price to US$100 was assumed as a 
more plausible economic scenario. Because of the high level of economic 
uncertainty, a severe decline in gold price is not foreseen, as gold preserves its 
status as a safe haven. It should be mentioned that commodity prices have limited 
impact on credit risk in the present model, since they only impact on credit risk for 
two sectors: mining and electricity.  
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4.2 The impact on loan loss provisions and capital 
Before discussing the impact of different macroeconomic stress scenarios on banks’ 
capital-adequacy ratios, the underlying assumptions should be stated. 
First, the assumption is made that the estimated historic relationship is going to hold 
for the future, which is a very stringent assumption considering that the available data 
did not allow for estimating a meaningful model for the period before 2001. 
Therefore, a symmetrical reaction of credit risk to macroeconomic environment 
during upswing and downturn phases of the business cycle is assumed. However, it 
should also be reminded that model estimated for the upswing phase of the cycle 
overestimated credit risk when applied to actual data in the downturn phase.  
Second, the assumption is made that future profits are going to be zero and thus 
additional loan loss provisions were directly subtracted from current capital, only 
controlling for a tax reduction of 28 per cent. In reality, the South African banking 
sector is highly profitable and profits can serve as a buffer against future credit 
losses. In addition, the assumption is made that no managerial or regulatory actions 
take place when macroeconomic conditions start to deteriorate or first signs of 
distress are visible. While this is an unrealistic assumption, the reality is impossible to 
model.  
 
Despite the above assumptions that render the estimations in this study rather 
conservative, the assumption is also made that there is no contagion between banks, 
no bank runs and no second-round effects, which leads to underestimation of the 
impact.  
 
Based on the above assumptions, additional loan loss provisions and new capital-
adequacy requirement ratios for the South African banking sector were computed 
under three different macroeconomic stress scenarios, which are described in 
section 4.1. The computations are first done for the largest five banks, which are 
systemically important institutions, and then for all banks, including foreign branches. 
In addition, the findings are based on a model for total loan loss provisions (columns 
2−3), and then on separate models for different economic sectors (columns 4−5). 
The implications of different macroeconomic scenarios on loan loss provisions and 
capital adequacy ratios are reported in Table 8. 
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The results of this study indicate that loan loss provisions increase significantly under 
all scenarios. The results are not very sensitive to the model used or the number of 
banks that were taken into account. The five largest banks had a loan loss provision 
ratio of 0,88 in June 2008, but that increases to 3,39 – 3,54 under the second 
scenario depending on a model used. This large increase is primarily driven by the 
assumption of 12 per cent decline in nominal property prices, which corresponds to 
29 per cent decline in real prices. Under other scenarios, a slightly smaller 
deterioration of credit quality is predicted. 
Table 8 The impact of various scenarios on capital adequacy and credit 
impairments to total credit ratio 
 
Model for total loans Sectoral models
 Capital
Loan loss 
provision Capital 
Loan loss 
provision
Applied to five largest banks  
Current ratio for five largest banks 12,37 0,88 12,37 0,88
Scenario 1: worst historic 9,68 3,21 9,63 3,25
Scenario 2: two standard deviations 9,48 3,39 9,31 3,54
Scenario 3: expert 10,46 2,50 10,51 2,45
  
Applied to all banks  
Current ratio for all banks 12,7 1,02 12,7 1,02
Scenario 1: worst historic 10,02 3,34 9,99 3,36
Scenario 2: two standard deviations 9,82 3,52 9,67 3,66
Scenario 3: expert 10,78 2,63 10,85 2,57
Source: Computed by author 
 
Despite large credit losses, the South African banking sector remains adequately 
capitalised by international standards due to the high level of current capital 
adequacy. Under the most plausible scenario 3, the capital-adequacy ratio amounts 
to around 10,5 for the five largest banks and 10,8 for all banks. As mentioned earlier, 
property prices play a large role in the present model and therefore the results are 
very sensitive to the assumption on developments in property prices. For illustrative 
purposes, one could change the scenario 3 assumption of zero nominal property 
price growth. However, the capital adequacy of the five largest banks remains above 
the required level of 9,5 per cent even if one assumed an 11 per cent decline in 
nominal property prices, which corresponds to 26 per cent decline in real prices. 
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Based on our investigation of property prices presented in Appendix B, such a large 
decline is extremely unlikely in the South African context,  
5 Conclusions 
 
The study applied macroeconomic credit risk modelling to the South African banking 
sector.  
 
In the first step, separate models for household, mining, electricity, transportation and 
other sectors are constructed, relying on loan loss provisions in each sector for the 
period 2001−2008. The findings uncover that the main drivers of credit risk are high 
interest rates and declining property prices. This reflects the situation where the 
largest share of a credit portfolio consists of mortgages at flexible interest rates. 
Because of the high importance attached to property prices, an analysis was made of 
whether the recent growth in property prices reflected fundamentals. The finding is 
that the main drivers of growth in property prices are inflation, interest rates and 
construction costs, and these variables accurately describe changes in property 
prices. In the second step, three macroeconomic scenarios that describe extreme, 
but plausible, stressful scenarios are developed. Finally, additional loan loss 
provisions and new capital-adequacy ratios under these scenarios were computed.  
 
The findings show that South African banks’ risk-bearing capacity is more than 
adequate. Under very severe crisis scenarios, when real property prices decline by 
26 per cent, considerable losses to the household credit portfolio are accumulated, 
but they are sufficiently covered by the current capital-adequacy ratios.  
 
Future work is needed to address issues discussed in this paper. Most importantly, 
there is a need to enhance a reliable database with a long-term horizon over upswing 
and downturn phases of economic cycles. Ideally, it would be useful to build a model 
relying on firm level data provided by credit registries.  
 
There is also a need to address feedback effects (IMF, 2007). When faced with an 
adverse macro scenario, banks will re-optimise their behaviour accordingly and their 
responses may not follow similar reactions as in the past. Risk-minimising responses 
that are perfectly rational at the level of individual institutions have unintended 
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consequences and lead to more risk in the aggregate (Sorge, 2004). In the South 
African case, one of the possible feedback effects that deserves to be analysed is 
property prices. Declining property prices prompt banks to curtail their financing of 
mortgages by raising their lending standards in order to minimise risk. However, the 
diminished availability of mortgage financing would diminish demand for property, 
driving property prices down further.  
 
Finally, what has not been addressed in this paper is the trade-off between monetary 
policy and financial stability. The study has shown that South African banks are very 
sensitive to interest rate increases. Therefore, when designing monetary policy, 
serious consideration should be given to the potential impact on the stability of the 
banking sector.  
Appendix A. Performance of the models 
 
Figure A1 Performance of the model for total loans 
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Figure A2 Performance of the model for loans to individuals 
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Figure A3 Performance of the model for loans to the mining sector 
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Figure A4 Performance of the model for loans to the transport sector 
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Figure A5 Performance of the model for loans to the electricity sector 
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 Appendix B. House prices and economic fundamentals 
B.1 Price-to-rent ratio 
 
One of the ways to test whether property price changes reflect fundamentals is to 
look at the ratio of house price to rent of an equivalent house. This price-to-rent ratio 
is similar to the price-to-earnings ratio observed in capital markets and the underlying 
idea is that the price of a house should be equivalent to income derived from future 
rent of the house or saved from paying rent. Rent is generally very closely tied to 
supply and demand fundamentals, and one rarely sees an unsustainable "rent 
bubble". Therefore, a rapid increase of home prices which is not accompanied with 
booming rental market can signal a property bubble. 
 
There is no public data available either for property prices or rents in South Africa. 
One of the most reliable indicators is the house price index, calculated by ABSA, one 
of the largest banks. Unfortunately, there are no data on the rent index of houses, but 
Rode & Associates publish a rent index for flats in four of the largest cities in South 
Africa (i.e., Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban). Therefore, a proxy for 
the price-to-rent ratio can be calculated, namely a ratio of house price index to flat 
rent index. This indicator is presented in Figure B1.  
 
Figure B1 The ratio of house price index to flat rent index 
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Source: Computed by author 
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 Figure B1 shows that house prices and rents increased at a similar pace at the 
beginning of the analysed period, but house price growth overtook rent growth after 
2002. This might signal an overshooting in housing prices. However, the ratio of 
housing prices to rent still remains below the international standards, and this recent 
increase might rather reflect the catching-up of housing prices due to higher credit 
availability for large segments of the South African population.  
 
B2. Model-based forecasting of property prices 
 
House price dynamics can also be modelled in terms of changes in housing demand 
and supply. On the demand side, the key factors are typically taken to be expected 
change in house prices (P), household income (Y), the real rate on housing loans (r), 
financial wealth (W), demographic and labour market factors (D), and a vector of 
other demand shifters, such as location, age and state of housing, or institutional 
factors that facilitate or hinder households’ access to the housing market (Egert and 
Mihaljek, 2007).  
                                                       ( , , , , )HD f P Y r W D
      
 
The supply of housing is usually described as a positive function of the profitability of 
construction business which, in turn, positively depends on house prices and 
negatively on real costs of construction (C).  
                                                            ( , )HS f P C
   
 
If one assumes that prices are in equilibrium, with demand equal to supply all the 
time, house prices can be expressed by the following reduced form equation: 
 
                                                       ( , , , )HP f Y r D C
     
 
In the first step, the long-term relationship between house price index and a set of 
long-term drivers, such as GDP per capita and population (Table B1), is analysed. 
Non-stationarity is tested for, relying on the panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and 
Chia-Shang (2002); Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003); Maddala and Wu (1999); and 
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Hadri (2000). All tests show that GDP per capita and population is non-stationary. 
Since there is evidence of the presence of unit roots in the present time series, the 
test is for the panel cointegration among the variables using tests suggested by Kao 
(1999) and Pedroni (1995) with the null hypothesis that the estimated equation is not 
cointegrated. The findings of this study strongly point to the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship between housing price index and other variables. 
 
Table B1 Long-term determinants of house price index 
Dependent variable: House price index 
 Coefficient
Economic 
significance
GDP per capita 0,046*** 163,64
Population 214,2063*** 31,51
Constant -4650,66***
R2 0,99
***, ** and * correspond to 1, 5, and 10 significance levels, respectively. 
Source: Computed by author 
 
After running unit root and cointegration tests, a dynamic OLS methodology is used 
to estimate the long-run cointegrating relationship. An analysis of whether the 
housing price index lies above or below its long-term equilibrium level is conducted 
and a measure of imbalances that is a deviation of the house price index from its 
long-term trend is constructed. In the second step, this measure is incorporated into 
the predictions of real property prices growth, which additionally include such 
explanatory variables as interest rate, inflation, GDP growth, stock exchange index 
growth and building costs (Table B2). 
 
The results show that recent growth in property prices can be attributed to both 
demand and supply factors. On the one hand, low inflation and interest rates 
increased demand for housing due to affordable mortgages. On the other hand, 
higher building costs were translated into higher property prices. A two-standard 
deviations increase in building costs (an 8,6 percentage point increase) leads to a 
9 percentage point increase in real property prices. By contrast, higher GDP growth 
had a limited impact on the growth of property prices.6  
 
                                                
6 An effort was also made to input wage and/or employment growth, but this had either no impact or a 
significantly lower impact than GDP growth.  
 
Table B2 Short-term determinants of property prices 
Dependent variable: Real property price growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Economic 
significance
Interest rate -1,14*** -1,18*** -1,40*** -1,48*** -0,61*** -3,21
Inflation -2,88*** -3,15*** -3,33*** -3,79*** -2,33*** -13,85
GDP growth   -0,62** 0,89*** 0,77*** 2,819
JSE index    -0,24*** -0,10*** -4,04
Building costs     1,06*** 9,08
ECT  -0,19*** -0,18*** -0,11** -0,11*** 
Constant 31,42*** 33,37*** 37,79*** 39,72*** 12,60*** 
R 2 0,65 0,68 0,69 0,77 0,88 
***, ** and * correspond to 1, 5, and 10 significance levels, respectively. 
Source: Computed by author 
 
 
In order to see whether real growth in property prices during the past few years 
reflected fundamentals, the actual and estimated house price growth were plotted 
(Figure B2). The figure shows that the estimated model is very accurate in describing 
movements in housing prices.  
 
Figure B2 Actual and estimated house price growth 
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Despite the fact that growth in housing prices reflected fundamentals, little of it was 
driven by higher income or employment. And this is reflected in the skyrocketing 
debt-to-income ratio presented in Figure B3. Higher indebtedness leads to higher 
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repayment costs for households, undermining affordability of housing. This is 
particularly crucial in the South African environment, where mortgages are extended 
at flexible interest rates. It should also be taken into account that a large part of 
mortgages is extended to new borrowers, whose propensity to repay their loans has 
not been tested.  
 
Figure B3 Ratio of household debt to disposable income 
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